Pakistan army fields

Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine

From the time of the 65 war, through that of 71 and until the Indian Army excercise Brass Tacks in 1987, emphasis was on static defence of the LOC and the border. Penetration of Indian territory would be undertaken only on an opportunity basis. the doctrine was flawed, mainly because of lack of strategic depth in Pakistan, but no alternative was given serious consideration until it was realised that a "stand and fight" doctrine would probably result in deep penetration by Indian forces without Pakistani forces being able to manoeuver effectively. the Indian army would have gained and retained the initiative, enabling it to destroy Pakistani formations piecemeal as they reacted to Indian thrusts.

The "Riposte" is simple in concept: it is intended that the two strike corps conduct a limited advance along narrow fronts with the objective of occupying indian territory near the border, probably to a depth of 40 to 50 km. Pakistan considers that international pressure would result in a ceasefire after a maximum of three weeks of conflict, enough time to gain some territory to be used in subsequent bargaining. there would be acceptance of Indian penetration, which would be inevitable given the comparitive lack of mobility within the Infantry heavy divisions. Independent Armoured and Mechanized Brigades are intended for quick counter attack and exploitation and would add considerable weight to advances by the strike corps.

The "Riposte" is practiced at all levels. Major excercises involve the crossing of water obstacles and minefields at night with emphasis on subsequent break-out and rapid advance. So far as has been seen, the concept has been adequately translated into workable plans which are continuously being refined. However, complete mechanization of the strike corps and other formations was slowed by the effects of US sanctions and it will take some time for them to achieve desired mobility, although US army surplus equipment is now being rapidly delivered, and local manufacture and rebuilding of US supplied AFV/APC has received considerable impetus, thus improving the mechanization process.

The army took great interest in the Indian army/airforce excercise Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power, conducted in Punjab from 1-10 May 2005). in view of its emphasis on maintaining mobility while operating closed down against nuclear attack. Pakistan's own counter - nuclear preparedness is patchy, and it is doubtful that even the strike corps could fight through a nuclear battlefield.

India's doctrine of "Cold Start" involving swift penetration of Pakistan with the aim of isolating, destroying or capturing vital points (such as nuclear stores and other installations has resulted in some modification to the Riposte, in that acceptability of penetration could be fatal to counter-penetration plans. in the event of an indian advance reaching or crossing the line of the main Lahore-Karachi highway, it is likely there would be consideration of employment of tactical nuclear missiles.

Bases 
Major Army bases are located at:

Karachi

Mangla

Lahore

Multan 

Peshawar

Quetta

Rawalpindi

Bahawalpur


Training
Training is the overall responsibility of the Inspector General, Training and Evaluation (IG T&E) in GHQ. The army relies largely on the efficient regimental system whereby each infantry regiment has its own training center, as have other arms and services. Initial training of officers (now including females in other than the Medical Corps) is conducted mainly at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, Abbotabad. Standards are adequate, although the course is too short, and emphasis has to be placed on instruction in the English language.

Regimental and special-to-arms and -services training is of a high standard but there is much learning by rote, which tends to reduce initiative. Instruction at army schools (such as the School of Infantry and Tactics at Quetta) is impressive and courses are conducted efficiently. This also applies to the Command and Staff College. Directing staff are high quality and the syallabus is sound. However, the culture of chappa- an anxiety to conform, resulting in emphasis on obtaining "correct" solutions from former students - produces careful, but imitative papers. Despite this, topic discussion is energetic, and the product is generally good.

Advanced technical training and graduate/post-graduate studies are carried out under the aegis of the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), which involves the Colleges of Medicine, Signals, Military Engg and Electrical and Mechanical Engg. These are linked with civilian, naval and airforce institutions and with Michigan State (US) and Cranfield (UK) universities.

Advanced courses for officers are conducted at National Defence University in Islamabad, of which the two main courses (August to June) are the National Defence Course (brigadiers and equivalent) and the Armed Forces War Course (lieutenant colonels and equivalent). Instruction is world standard.

Individual and collective training in units is conducted in an annual cycle, usually dictated by the timing of higher-level excercises. Sub-unit and unit excercises generally held in summer, with brigade and divisional manoeuveres after the harvest and in winter.
There has been emphasis on computer-based war gaming, with consequent improvement in staff work, especially in logistics. In the 1965 and 1971 wars, few formations were far from base facilities and supply dumps and it is only comparitively recently that battlefield recovery and practice in forward supply have been alotted the importance they deserve. Much training focuses on obstacle crossing, as there are extensive natural and manmade water barriers on both sides of the border, especially in Punjab.

Since 2001, following the invasion of Afghanistan, there has been a gradual than accelerating requirement to counter terrorism and insurgency, especially in, but far from limited to, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). As the main task of the army was defence of the eastern border, and low level border control was almost exclusively the responsibility of the Pakistan Rangers and the Frontier Corps (the latter assisted by tribal irregulars), there was no particular emphasis on instruction in counter insurgency. When it became necessary to deploy formation HQ and units to the western regions it became apparent that such instruction was essential, and unit and sub-unit training was undertaken concurrently with modification of syllabi in army schools such as the School of Infantry and Tactics. It is expected that this emphasis will be maintained, given the senstivity of the western border regions and the decreasing likelihood of conflict with India (?).